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We examine the impact of di¤erent degrees of …scal feedback on debt in an economy with
nominal rigidities where monetary policy is optimal. We look at the extent to which di¤erent
degrees of …scal feedback enhances or detracts from the ability of the monetary authorities to
stabilise output and in‡ation. Using an objective function derived from utility, we …nd the
optimal level of …scal feedback to be small. There is a clear discontinuity in the behaviour of
monetary policy and welfare either side of this optimal level. As the extent of …scal feedback
increases, optimal monetary policy becomes less active because …scal feedback tends to de‡ate
in‡ationary shocks. However this …scal stabilisation is less e¢cient than monetary policy, and
so welfare declines. In contrast, if …scal feedback falls below some critical value optimal
monetary policy becomes strongly passive, and this passive monetary policy leads to a sharp
deterioration in welfare.
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11 Introduction
With the occasional and notable exception, most governments now see one of their primary
economic responsibilities as ensuring that the national debt stays within reasonable bounds. In
some cases explicit targets for the debt to GDP ratio have been announced, with the implication
that if debt deviates from this target, some form of ‘…scal feedback’ via taxes or spending will
operate. However it is also recognized that any attempt to control the debt stock, or the public
sector de…cit, too tightly may induce instability in other macroeconomic variables. In this paper
we examine this trade-o¤.
We work with a standard New Keynesian model of a closed economy with Calvo pricing to
examine how optimal monetary policy varies with the degree to which …scal instruments respond
to the state of government indebtedness, as measured by …scal feedback. Traditionally it was
thought that some minimum level of …scal feedback was required for a stable and determinate
economy. However, the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level literature1 has argued that a determinate
equilibrium may be possible when no feedback occurs, but where prices adjust to ensure the
government’s intertemporal budget constraint holds. If …scal feedback is strong, such that …scal
adjustments ensure the government’s budget is satis…ed, monetary policy is ‘active’ in the sense
that it focuses on the control of in‡ation; if the …scal feedback is negligible, monetary policy
becomes ‘passive’ in that it must also ensure …scal solvency. This paper provides a systematic
treatment of the nature of equilibrium over the range of …scal feedback parameters.2
Our analysis forms a bridge between the literature on optimal monetary policy and the litera-
ture on joint monetary-…scal optimization. The former work, as exempli…ed by Woodford (2003),
examines optimal monetary responses to shocks where there are lump-sum taxes available to
continuously satisfy the government budget constraint. The latter literature, and in particular
Benigno and Woodford (2004), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2007), have looked at joint optimization where there are no constraints on the movement of at
least one …scal instrument. However, neither of these approaches allow us to examine the im-
plications that the (mis)conduct of …scal policy can have on the operation of optimal monetary
policy. Here we do this by computing optimal monetary policy conditional on …scal actions in
the form of simple debt-controlling rules. This description of …scal policy appears to be a more
realistic modelling of current institutional arrangements. It is generally the case that …scal policy
1See Leeper (1991), Woodford (1996), but also Buiter (2002) for a more critical view.
2The terms ‘active’ and ‘passive’ monetary policy are derived from Leeper (1991). Leeper (1991) also describes
strong …scal feedback as ‘passive …scal policy’ and negligable …scal feedback as ‘active …scal policy’.
1is far less ‡exible than monetary policy, and partly as a result, the focus of policy makers seems
to be on how quickly government indebtedness should be corrected, as the debates around the
Stability and Growth Pact of the European Monetary Union illustrate.3
We provide a welfare ranking of policies based on a measure derived from consumer utility,
and we also compute joint monetary-…scal optimization as a benchmark. We …nd that active
monetary policy combined with su¢cient …scal feedback clearly dominates a passive monetary
policy when …scal feedback is negligible. The optimal degree of …scal feedback occurs when debt
follows a path very close to a unit root process, mirroring the path of debt under joint monetary-
…scal optimization. When government spending is the …scal instrument, this optimal degree of
…scal feedback produces a level of welfare that is only very slightly worse that joint monetary-
…scal optimization, suggesting that the costs of restricting …scal policy to a simple debt feedback
rule are negligible in this case.
However, we …nd that there are two cases where optimal monetary policy can take on passive
features (in the sense that interest rates initially fall following a cost-push shock) even when there
is signi…cant …scal feedback. The …rst is when the initial level of debt is high, so that changes
in interest rates are a particularly e¤ective way of managing debt. The second is where the
…scal feedback parameter is too large from a welfare perspective, such that this strong feedback
stabilizes in‡ation as well as debt. As a result, monetary policy is no longer required to play an
active stabilization role, but this substitution is ine¢cient in terms of social welfare.
We …nd that the strength of …scal feedback a¤ects the stability properties of the economy.
When …scal feedback is either completely absent or above a certain threshold optimal monetary
policy is able to stabilize both in‡ation and debt. When …scal feedback is non-zero but small, we
…nd that optimal monetary policy chooses policies that allow debt to follow a mildly explosive
path. This path for debt implies that the economy as a whole does not return to a stationary
equilibrium after a temporary shock. Nevertheless, discounting implies that this mildly explosive
behavior represents the optimal outcome for monetary policy.
Our initial results are derived assuming that government spending is the …scal instrument in
the feedback rule. We then examine a feedback rule that uses income taxes as an instrument.
This produces similar results, although in this case feedback that is too strong (in welfare terms)
has less of an impact on monetary policy and welfare. We also examine the robustness of our
results to replacing ‘in…nitely lived’ consumers with consumers who face a constant probability of
3This does not imply …scal policy makers are ‘irrational’, but may simply re‡ect overriding political economy
concerns that are outside the scope of this paper.
2death (and leave no bequests). In this case, joint monetary-…scal optimization no longer implies
a unit root process for debt. While other elements of our results remain unchanged, this analysis
does highlight the intergenerational aspects of di¤erent degrees of …scal feedback.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our core model, where consumers are
‘in…nitely lived’. In Section 3 we present the case of joint monetary-…scal optimization, which
provides a benchmark for our analysis. Section 4 presents our main results, where we use a
feedback rule from debt to government spending. We discuss the method and form of the solution
in Section 4.2, and then examine its properties in terms of monetary policy and welfare in Section
4.3. Section 5 examines the robustness of our results. We …rst consider using taxes, or taxes and
spending, as …scal instruments (Section 5.1), then vary the level of steady state debt (Section
5.2) and consider di¤erent shocks (Section 5.3). Finally we adapt our model to include consumers
with …nite lives, and look at intergenerational issues (Section 5.4). Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Consumers
Our model of the household sector is familiar from Woodford (2003). Our economy is inhabited by
a large number of individuals, who specialize in the production of a di¤erentiated good (indexed
by z), and who spend h(z) of e¤ort in its production. They consume a basket of goods C, and







￿v￿t [u(Cv;￿v) + f(Gv;￿v) ￿ v(hv(z);￿v)]: (1)
Here ￿ is a preference shock. The price of a di¤erentiated good z is denoted by p(z); and
the aggregate price level is P: An individual chooses optimal consumption and work e¤ort to
maximize criterion (1) subject to the demand system and the ‡ow budget constraint:
PtCt + Et (Qt;t+1At+1) ￿ At + (1 ￿ ￿t)(wt(z)ht(z) + ￿t(z)) + T; (2)
where PtCt =
R 1
0 p(z)c(z)dz is nominal consumption, At are nominal …nancial assets of a house-
hold, ￿t is pro…t and T is a constant lump-sum tax/subsidy. Here w is the wage rate, and ￿t
is a tax rate on income. Qt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor which determines the price in
period t to the individual of being able to carry a state-contingent amount At+1 of wealth into
period t + 1. The riskless short term nominal interest rate it has the following representation in





Each individual consumes the same basket of goods. Goods are aggregated into a Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) consumption index with the elasticity of substitution between any pair of goods










We assume that the net present value of individual’s future income is bounded. We also
assume that the nominal interest rate is positive at all times. These assumptions rule out in…nite
consumption and allow us to replace the in…nite sequence of ‡ow budget constraints of the




Qt;vCvPv ￿ At + Et
1 X
v=t
Qt;v f(1 ￿ ￿v)(wv(z)hv(z) + ￿v(z))) + Tg: (3)
The optimization requires that the household exhaust its intertemporal budget constraint and,
in addition, the household’s wealth accumulation must satisfy the no Ponzi game condition:
lim
s!1
Et (Qt;sAs) = 0: (4)
We assume the speci…c functional form for the utility from consumption component, u(Cv;￿t) =
(Cv￿t)1￿1=￿













Additionally, aggregate (nominal) asset accumulation is given by
At+1 = (1 + it)(At + (1 ￿ ￿t)(WtNt + ￿t) ￿ PtCt ￿ T); (6)
where Wt and Nt are aggregate wages and employment.
We linearize equation (5) around the steady state (here and everywhere below for each variable
Xt with steady state value X, we use the notation ^ Xt = ln(Xt=X)). Equation (5) leads to the
following Euler equation (intertemporal IS curve):
^ Ct = Et ^ Ct+1 ￿ ￿ (^ {t ￿ Et^ ￿t+1) + ￿t+1 ￿ ￿t: (7)
In‡ation is ￿t = Pt
Pt￿1 ￿ 1 and we assume steady state in‡ation is zero.
4We make this parameter stochastic to allow us to generate shocks to the mark-up of …rms.
42.2 Price Setting
Price setting is based on Calvo contracting as set out in Woodford (2003). Each period agents
recalculate their prices with …xed probability 1￿￿: If prices are not recalculated (with probability
￿), they remain …xed. Following Woodford (2003) and allowing for government consumption terms
in the utility function, we can derive the following Phillips curve for our economy5:
^ ￿t = ￿Et^ ￿t+1 +
(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿) 
￿ (  + ￿)
^ st; (8)


















^ ￿t + ^ ￿t:
The shock ^ ￿t is a mark-up shock and ^ ￿t is a technology shock, as we assume the production
function yt = Ztht; Zt = Zt￿1￿t; where ￿t has a mean of unity. Here   = vy=vyyy and ￿ is the
steady state income tax rate.
Under ‡exible prices and in the steady state the real wage is always equal to the monopolistic














where superscript n denotes natural levels (see Woodford (2003)), and ￿w is a steady state





















^ ￿t = 0: (10)
2.3 Fiscal Constraint
The government buys goods (Gt), taxes income (with tax rate ￿t), raises lump-sum taxes, pays
an employment subsidy and issues nominal debt Bt. The evolution of the nominal debt stock can
be written as:
Bt+1 = (1 + it)(Bt + PtGt ￿ ￿tPtYt ￿ T + ￿w):
The employment subsidy (￿w) and lump-sum taxes (T) are constant. This equation can be
linearized as (de…ning Bt = Bt=Pt￿1 and denoting the steady state ratio of debt to output as ￿) :




￿ ^ Bt ￿ ￿^ ￿t + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ Gt ￿ ￿
￿
^ ￿t + ^ Yt
￿￿
: (11)
where ￿ = C=Y in steady state.
5The derivation is identical to the one in Woodford (2003), amended by the introduction of mark-up shocks as
in Beetsma and Jensen (2004a).
52.4 Aggregate Relationships
Output is distributed as wages and pro…ts:
Yt = WtNt + ￿t: (12)
Government expenditures constitute part of demand, so the national income identity can be
written as
Yt = Ct + Gt; (13)
and in steady state G = (1 ￿ ￿)Y: The linearized national income identity is then:
^ Yt = (1 ￿ ￿) ^ Gt + ￿ ^ Ct: (14)
2.5 Behavior of the Economy
We now write down the …nal system of equations for the ‘law of motion’ of the out-of-steady-state
economy. We simplify notation by using lower case letters to denote ‘gap’ variables, where the gap
is the di¤erence between actual levels and natural levels i.e. xt = ^ Xt ￿ ^ Xn
t : The model consists
of an intertemporal IS curve (15), the Phillips curve (16), national income identity (17), and an
equation explaining the evolution of debt (18). We could use the linearized assets accumulation
equation (6) instead of (18) as they are equivalent (equation (19)). The system is:
ct = Etct+1 ￿ ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1); (15)










￿t + ^ ￿t
￿
; (16)
yt = (1 ￿ ￿)gt + ￿ct; (17)




~ bt ￿ ￿￿t + (1 ￿ ￿)gt ￿ ￿ (￿t + yt)
￿
+ ^ ￿t; (18)
~ at = ~ bt; (19)
where parameter ￿ =
(1￿￿￿)(1￿￿) 











^ ￿t is a composite
shock. We denote ~ bt = ￿ ^ Bt: Note that preference and technology shocks only appear in so far as
they impact on debt, while cost push shocks matter through the Phillips curve.
It remains to specify policy. We do this in Section 3, where we also discuss some benchmark
results of full optimization.
62.6 Calibration
We take the model’s frequency to be quarterly. To achieve a steady state rate of interest of
approximately 4%, we set the household discount rate ￿ to 0.99. Output is normalized to one,
and the ratio of government consumption to output, 1￿￿; is 0.25, which determines the relative
preference for government spending in utility. The remaining parameters of the utility function
are typical of those used in the literature, see e.g. Canzoneri et al. (2006). The elasticity of
intertemporal substitution ￿ is taken as 1/1.5, the Calvo parameter ￿ is set at 0.75 so as to imply
average contracts of about a year, the elasticity of demand is taken as " = 7:0 to achieve a 17%
mark up, and the elasticity of labour demand is taken as   = 1=3.
We consider three values for the debt to GDP ratio. Our ‘high’ debt level corresponds to 60%
of annual output, which is the level of debt in a number of European economies. For analytical
purposes, it is useful to consider a ‘low debt’ case where the steady state debt is zero. (Although
unusual, such cases are not unknown: New Zealand, Sweden and Ireland have net debt to GDP
ratios close to zero.) Our base case for ￿ is the midpoint of 30% of annual output. We discuss
these …gures further in Section 5.2 below.
Following Ireland (2004) and Canzoneri et al. (2006), the preference shock is calibrated as an
AR(1) process ^ ￿t = ￿￿^ ￿t￿1 + "￿t with ￿￿ = 0:9 and ￿ ("￿t) = 0:03: We calibrate the productivity
shock as an AR(1) process ^ ￿t = ￿￿^ ￿t￿1+"qt with ￿￿ = 0:9 and ￿ ("￿t) = 0:0075: This is broadly in
line with the values used in Canzoneri et al. (2006) (￿￿;￿ ("￿t)) = (0:92;0:0090)), Ireland (2004)
(￿￿;￿ ("￿t)) = (1:00;0:0109)) and those used in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) (￿￿;￿ ("￿t)) =
(0:86;0:0064)). 6 Among these three studies, only Ireland (2004) uses a cost-push shock, which
is AR(1) with a standard deviation of 0.0044. Smets and Wouters (2003) reports an i.i.d. cost
push shock with a much smaller standard deviation in the model with in‡ation persistence, while
Rudebusch (2002) estimates a standard deviation of 0.01 for an i.i.d. cost push shock. In the
analysis below, we calibrate the standard deviation of an i.i.d. cost-push shock as 0.005. In our
base line case this generates a standard deviation for in‡ation of 0.0038 that is the same order of
magnitude as empirical data in developed countries over the last couple of decades.
3 Joint Optimisation as a Benchmark Case
The primary aim of this paper is to study the e¤ect of a …scal policy on monetary policy decisions.
As a benchmark case we …rst compute a fully optimal policy i.e. joint monetary-…scal optimiza-
6Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) do not consider either taste shocks or cost-push shocks.



































where O(3) collects terms of higher than second order and terms independent of policy, and all ai
are positive. This quadratic approximation to social welfare is obtained assuming that there is a
constant production subsidy ￿w = T that eliminates the distortion caused by monopolistic com-
petition and income taxes in steady state. (This approach follows Woodford (2003). Sutherland
(2002) and Benigno and Woodford (2004) use an alternative way of eliminating …rst order terms
from welfare, while Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) do not use a linear quadratic framework, but
instead adopt a Ramsey approach.) We assume that the authorities have su¢cient credibility to
commit to the time inconsistent plan, so it can implement the …rst best time inconsistent solution.
Note that expression (21) contains a quadratic term in government spending, g. This term
enters the welfare expression because it is assumed in (1) that households derive utility from
the consumption of public goods, and that the level of government spending in steady state
re‡ects this. However, if we instead assumed that government spending was pure waste, but the
government still used g as a policy instrument, changes in g would still in‡uence social welfare
through the national income identity, but it would not constitute an independent source of welfare
loss.
In order to solve for the fully optimal policy we specify system matrices and use MATLAB
code by Söderlind (1999). The procedure is straightforward and non-innovative, so we only discuss
the results, which are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1 shows that cost-push shocks have a much greater impact on social welfare than
preference or productivity shocks when policy is optimal. This is a well known result, and
arises because mark up shocks change the relationship between in‡ation and output, both of
which are key policy objectives. In contrast, the impact of preference or productivity shocks
only matter through their impact on debt: if lump sum taxes were available as a stabilization
policy instrument, monetary policy could fully o¤set these shocks. Although lump sum taxes
are constant in our case, the behavior of debt discussed below means that shocks to debt have
8Shocks Welfare loss of fully optimal monetary and
applied …scal policy if …scal instruments are:
spending taxes spending and taxes
cost-push 2.054 0.230 0.220
taste 2.53￿10￿5 1.25￿10￿6 1.19￿10￿6
productivity 4.49￿10￿5 2.22￿10￿6 2.12￿10￿6
all shocks 2.054 0.230 0.220
Table 1: Welfare implications of shocks, measured as percent of steady state consumption under
monetary-…scal optimisation.
little impact on welfare, see also Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007). Our analysis below is based on
applying the full menu of shocks, but as cost-push shocks are likely to dominate we also consider
a case where there are only preference and productivity shocks (Section 5.3).
Figure 1 shows the path of key variables following a unit cost-push shock. The most straight-
forward case is where only government spending is available as an instrument. Here monetary
policy responds to the increase in in‡ation generated by the cost-push shock, raising interest rates
in both the initial and subsequent periods. Higher interest rates raise the level of debt, which
increases gradually but eventually stabilizes at a new higher level. This unit root process for
steady state debt, which is noted for joint monetary-…scal optimization in Benigno and Woodford
(2004) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), is an extension of a result from the tax smooth-
ing literature (Barro (1979)). As the welfare function is convex and there is discounting, it is
preferable to move …scal instruments by a small amount permanently to service a new higher
level of debt, rather than change them by a large amount on a temporary basis to return debt
to its initial level. Note, however, that the cut in government spending is larger in the …rst pe-
riod of the simulation than subsequent periods, so there is a very modest attempt to reduce the
size of the long run increase in debt. The reasons for this, and its implications for policy under
discretion, are discussed in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007). When income taxes are available as a
…scal instrument, then there is an initial attempt to directly o¤set to cost-push shock by cutting
taxes. Lower income taxes increase the incentive to work, which directly reduces the in‡ationary
consequences of the cost-push shock.
94 Fiscal stabilisation of debt
4.1 Simple Feedback Rules
A number of authors have used simple …scal rules where a …scal instrument responds to deviations
in debt from some reference value (for example Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007), Canzoneri et al.
(2006) among others). In the …rst part of our analysis we focus on the use of government spending
as an instrument, but we broaden it to include income taxes subsequently. Empirical estimates
of …scal policy reaction functions have tended to focus on cyclical behavior rather than debt
feedback (see Favero and Monacelli (2005), Taylor (2000), Auerbach (2002) for example), but
the evidence suggests that both government spending and taxes do move to stabilize debt (see
Muscatelli et al. (2004) for example). Our initial focus on spending is expositionally convenient,
for reasons that become clear when we consider taxes in Section 5.1. We postulate that out-of-
steady-state government expenditure Gt is related to out-of-steady-state debt according to the
following simple feedback rule:
Gt ￿ Gn
t = ￿￿(Bt ￿ B); (22)





Simple mechanistic rules for …scal policy more accurately re‡ect institutional rigidities in …scal
policymaking than full optimization, where the latter would imply that …scal instruments would
immediately respond in an optimal fashion to contemporaneous shocks. Of course there are a
variety of potential simple rules, but as our focus in this paper is on how debt stabilization a¤ects
optimal monetary policy, the speci…cation above seems appropriate. In addition, we note that
debt is the only state variable in our model. Furthermore, as we show below, when government
spending is the instrument this rule comes very close to reproducing the outcome that would
occur under full optimization, and so more complicated rules appear unnecessary in this case.
In what follows we shall explore the implications of di¤erent values of the …scal feedback
parameter ￿. We are interested in two key questions. First, can we distinguish clearly between
two policy ‘regimes’, as suggested by the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level and the results in Leeper
(1991) and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000)? If we can, how does welfare and optimal monetary
policy compare between regimes? Second, what is the optimal degree of …scal feedback on debt,
and what are the implications for welfare and monetary policy of departing from this optimum?
104.2 The Solution
In order to solve the model we use the method of Lagrange multipliers. Unlike the case of joint
optimization in Section 3, an analysis of …rst order conditions is crucial to explain certain dynamic
properties of the solution.
The central bank chooses the nominal interest rate to minimize social loss (21) subject to the
evolution of the economy. It is instructive to simplify the dynamic system (15)-(19) that describes
the evolution of out-of-steady-state economy, as observed by the monetary policymaker. We
substitute equations (17) and (52) into (16), (15) and (18), leaving only three dynamic equations
for cs; ￿s and ~ bs:
cs = Etcs+1 ￿ ￿(is ￿ Et￿s+1);











~ bs + ￿^ ￿s;




(1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)~ bs ￿ ￿￿s ￿ ￿￿cs
￿
+ ^ ￿s:

















































(1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)~ bs ￿ ￿￿s ￿ ￿￿cs
￿
+ ^ ￿s ￿~ bs+1
￿
:
In order to minimize the loss function in (21), we di¤erentiate the Lagrangian, L, with respect
11to Lc; L￿; Lb; ￿; c; b and i. The …rst order conditions for optimality are:
@L
@￿s







= 0 = ￿s￿taccs + ￿s￿tay￿
￿


























~ bs ￿ ￿￿s￿tay
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(1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)~ bs ￿ ￿￿s ￿ ￿￿cs
￿
+ ^ ￿s ￿~ bs+1; (30)
along with initial conditions Lc
t = L￿
t = 0;~ bt = ￿ b (see Currie and Levine (1993)).7
The linear di¤erence system (24)-(30) is closed with a dynamic process for the two exogenous
shocks ^ ￿st and ^ ￿t and this makes it to be of ninth order. It should be solved subject to nine
boundary conditions. We know …ve initial values: (i) initial values for predetermined endogenous
variables (debt in our case); (ii) Pontryagin’s maximum principle requires setting to zero initial
conditions for those Lagrange multipliers which are associated with dynamic constraints on non-
predetermined variables (see e.g. Currie and Levine (1993)), L￿ and Lc in our case; (iii) and initial
values of shocks ^ ￿ and ^ ￿: We need to de…ne an appropriate transversality conditions to close the





for any variable xt: Moreover, by imposing this transversality condition we guarantee that this
solution to the system (24)-(30) is unique if it exists.8
The system (24)-(30) plus dynamic processes for the shocks can be written in a matrix form





t; k 2 f￿;b;cg: This linear
7In all the analysis below we take ￿ b = 0 i.e. we assume we start from a position in which debt is at its steady
state.
8Solutions to the dynamic system (24)-(30) would always exist if we imposed lim
t!1
￿
t=2xt < 1: However, in this
case there can be multiple solutions with the asymptotic growth rate 1=
p
￿: Such solutions would not lead to …nite
welfare, but would still solve the system (24)-(30).
12system has nine generalized eigenvalues9, which are functions of the …scal feedback parameter
￿. The dynamics of the system can be fully described in terms of these eigenvalues. Moreover,
the speed of convergence of the economy towards the steady state is determined by the largest
eigenvalue of this system among those that are less than 1=
p
￿. This implies that system (24)-(30)
can have solutions that exhibit a (moderate) explosion. We now examine if this is indeed the
case.10
To do this, it is instructive to calculate values of ￿ that can generate an eigenvalue ￿(￿) =
1. We show in Appendix C that there are two solutions to the problem where some ￿(￿) = 1 in







(The economic interpretation of ￿￿ is discussed in the next section.) More speci…cally, at these
two points for ￿ we have the following structure of the generalized eigenvalues of system (24)-(30).
1. If ￿ = 0 then the nine generalized eigenvalues to this problem are:



































































































There are …ve generalized eigenvalues that are strictly less than 1=
p
￿; and the biggest of
them is equal to one.
9Since ￿ is singular, we deal with generalised eigenvalues, i.e. solutions ￿ of the equation det(￿￿￿￿) = 0: See
Klein (2000) on solutions of such systems. In what follows we will often omit the word ‘generalised’, but we keep
the meaning.
10Note that we work with a linearised model and an in…nite time horizon, so equations only remain valid in a
neighbourhood of the steady state. Although at some point a moderate explosion would exceed these boundaries,
the stability analysis is una¤ected.
132. If ￿ = ￿￿; then the eigenvalues are
￿1 = ￿2 = ￿3 = 0;
￿4 = solution of quadratic equation < 1;












There are …ve generalized eigenvalues that are strictly less than 1=
p
￿; and the biggest of
them is equal to one.
These two values of …scal feedback, 0 and ￿￿; split the set of possible feedbacks into the two
open sets: 0 < ￿ < ￿￿ and ￿ > ￿￿ We can also show numerically that for a relatively wide range
of 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿; ￿ ￿ ￿￿; the following holds:
(i) some eigenvalues remain either smaller than one or greater than 1
￿ for any 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ :
k￿8(￿)k = k￿9(￿)k = 1; k￿1(￿)k = k￿2(￿)k = k￿3(￿)k = 0; k￿4(￿)k < 1;k￿5(￿)k > 1=￿ .
None of these eigenvalues is the ‘biggest stable eigenvalue’ and so none of them will determine
the rate of convergence of the economy to the steady state following a shock.
(ii) Eigenvalues ￿5(￿);￿6(￿) behave in the following way. First of all, they do not intersect:
￿5(￿) < 1=
p
￿; and ￿5(￿) > 1=
p
￿:11 If 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿, ￿5(￿) increases from ￿5(0) = 1 up until
it almost reaches 1=
p
￿ and then decreases to ￿5(￿￿) = 1:￿6(￿) decreases from ￿6(0) = 1 down
until it almost reaches 1=
p
￿ and then increases back to ￿6(￿￿) = 1=￿: For ￿ > ￿￿, ￿5(￿) < 1
and ￿6(￿) > 1=￿: ￿5(￿) has a key role in determining the dynamic properties of the economy.
This dependence of eigenvalues on the value of …scal feedback ￿ is shown schematically in
Panel I in Figure 2, where eigenvalues are plotted against ￿. Depending on the value of ￿ we can
distinguish three cases.
1. Strong …scal feedback when ￿ ￿ ￿￿. When ￿ > ￿￿ we have …ve eigenvalues which are strictly
less than one, and four explosive eigenvalues (which are strictly greater than 1=￿ > 1=
p
￿).
Given …ve initial conditions and transversality conditions we obtain a unique solution. When
t increases, all economic variables, ~ bt;ct;￿t; once disturbed, necessarily converge to their
steady state values. We say that in this case the solution and the steady state it converges
11We show this analytically in Appendix C.
14to are asymptotically stable. When ￿ = ￿￿ then ￿5 = 1 and ￿6 = 1=￿: The sixth eigenvalue
is ruled out by the transversality conditions but ￿5 is accepted by them. The optimal
monetary policy thus generates unit-root dynamics of economic variables in response to
shocks. We say that in this case the solution, and the steady state it does not diverge from,
are just stable.
2. Zero …scal feedback when ￿ = 0. If ￿ = 0 we have ￿5 = 1; ￿6 = 1=￿: Again, transversality
conditions classify ￿5 as a just stable eigenvalue. We thus obtain a unique solution. We
can check that in this case neither of the economic variables bt;ct;￿t nor instrument it will
exhibit unit-root behavior, as the Lagrange multipliers have unit root dynamics.
3. Weak …scal feedback when 0 < ￿ < ￿￿. For the intermediate range of parameter ￿; 0 < ￿ <
￿￿; there are …ve eigenvalues that are less than 1=
p
￿; but one of them is greater than one.
The model thus exhibits explosive behavior. This explosive behavior is modest, as variables
grow at an asymptotic rate that is slower than the steady state rate of interest, 1=￿: The
implied loss is …nite.
These results suggest that we can de…ne three di¤erent regimes, determined by the two thresh-
old values of parameter ￿. Two regimes, the zero …scal feedback regime and the strong …scal
feedback regime, are regimes with stable solutions. The third regime, the weak …scal feedback
regime, generates a moderately explosive solution that delivers …nite social loss. Although such
behavior is theoretically possible, we are not aware of another example in the literature where it
would be optimal for monetary policy to support moderate explosion. Although this distinction
is made on the basis of dynamic stability properties, we shall see in the next section that there is a
substantial di¤erence among these regimes in the implied economic behavior of the policymaker.
4.3 Optimal Monetary Policy and Welfare
Panel II in Figure 2 presents the values of some key magnitudes as we change the degree of …scal
feedback ￿: The …rst two columns are identical except for the scale of ￿: the …rst column focuses
on small positive values of …scal feedback, whereas the second column gives results for a much
broader range.
The top two rows report monetary policy responses to the cost-push shock and debt. It is well
known (see Appendix B) that the unique solution for the optimal interest rate reaction function
in linear-quadratic models can be presented in the form of a linear relationship:
it = ￿￿^ ￿t + ￿￿^ ￿t + ￿b~ bt + #￿L￿
t + #cLc
t; (32)
15with feedback coe¢cients ￿ on predetermined states and predetermined Lagrange multipliers.
We plot two parameters from the implied reaction function for monetary policy (32): the feed-
back coe¢cient on the mark-up shock ￿￿ and on debt ￿b:12. Solid lines indicate solutions that
are asymptotically stable, while dotted lines are solutions that involve mild explosions (see the
discussion in the previous section).
The bottom row of Panel II plots the social welfare loss expressed as a percent reduction in
steady-state consumption. We discuss below the size of these welfare losses, and compare them
to the results in the relevant literature.
4.4 Three policy regimes
Figure 2 and the analysis in Section 4.2 suggest that there are two regimes in which all processes
are either asymptotically stable or unit root, and one in between which exhibits moderate explo-
sive behavior. We discuss them in turn.
The …rst regime occurs when ￿ = 0. Here we have no feedback from debt to …scal variables,
so we might suppose that debt in this model would be unstable. However, the results show that
monetary policy ensures the asymptotic stability of economic variables. It achieves this in two
ways, both shown in Panel II in Figure 2. First, ￿b ensures that any positive movement of debt
leads to a large fall in interest rates, which leads to correction through the government’s budget
constraint. Second, the reaction to a positive cost-push shock is also to reduce interest rates.
The negative feedback on debt is not surprising, given inaction by the …scal authorities. The
negative reaction to the cost-push shock is more interesting, and it raises the question of how
monetary policy stabilizes in‡ation in this case. To understand what is going on, Panel I in Figure
3 plots impulse responses to the cost-push shock for two cases, both of which set ￿ = 0: optimal
monetary policy (solid line), and for …xed nominal interest rates, which is a standard example
of a passive monetary policy in the literature. The cost push shock raises in‡ation, and when
interest rates are …xed this reduces debt. However, when in‡ation falls back, it returns to a small
negative number, and from there gradually converges to zero. This reduction in in‡ation slowly
increases debt, and allows it to return to its initial level. When monetary policy is optimal, then
in the …rst period there is a large reduction in interest rates, as Panel II in Figure 2 also shows,
but this is followed by an increase in interest rates. The key to why this path is optimal is that
both consumption and in‡ation are forward looking. Higher future interest rates largely o¤set
12The other # parameters are less informative. #L represent the integral control part of the reaction function
and therefore feedback on slow moving variables.
16the impact of the immediate decline in interest rates on …rst period consumption, and thereafter
consumption is below base. In‡ation depends on current and future consumption, so in‡ation
is lower in all periods as a result of this behavior in consumption. Of course debt depends on
its own past value through the budget constraint. Thus, by cutting interest rates initially and
raising them subsequently, monetary policy is able to both stabilize debt and moderate the initial
increase in in‡ation.13
In contrast, where ￿ ￿ ￿￿, the reaction to the cost-push shock is generally to raise interest
rates. The system is asymptotically stable for ￿ > ￿￿ and exhibits a unit-root behavior for ￿ =
￿￿: The contrast between behavior in the two regimes is illustrated in Panel II in Figure 3, which
plots the impulse response for key economic variables following a cost push shock for two values
of ￿: ￿ = 0 as a dashed line, and ￿ = ￿ ￿ > ￿￿ as a solid line, where ￿ ￿ is only marginally higher
than ￿￿ so the solution is asymptotically stable.
As we would expect from simply considering the government’s budget constraint, the value
￿￿ that produces unit-root behavior in debt will be a function of the steady state real interest
rate. However it is also a function of the tax rate, as the reduced form debt equation in Section
4.2 shows.14 A reduction in government spending will reduce debt directly, but it also reduces
income and therefore income taxes, which raises debt. Thus ￿￿ has to be greater than the steady
state real interest rate to just stabilize debt.
These two regimes are separated by a region 0 < ￿ < ￿￿ where the system is not asymptotically
stable, but has a ‘moderately’ explosive solution. In this case fully optimal monetary policy
chooses not to ensure the convergence of the economy back to the steady state. As we have
seen above, there is a clear con‡ict for monetary policy in both stabilizing debt and stabilizing
in‡ation when …scal feedback fails to stabilize debt. As a result, monetary policy pushes close to
the boundary one of these objectives, which is to allow debt to mildly explode in a manner that
keeps the welfare loss …nite and allows policy to reduce the initial impact on in‡ation.
There is a clear parallel between our results using optimal monetary policy and the active
and passive regimes described by Leeper (1991) and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000). In their case
a passive monetary policy is de…ned as a negative response of real interest rates when in‡ation is
13Although optimal policy produces larger deviations from the in‡ation target after the initial period than under
the …xed interest rate policy, the convexity of the welfare function implies that the impact of this on welfare is
more than o¤set by the impact of the reduction in in‡ation in the initial period.
14Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000) use a determinate condition (which is a necessary but not su¢cient condition for
a determinate or stable solution) to calculate analytically a value of …scal feedback of a similar order of magnitude
that divides their two policy regimes. They can do this because they use a Taylor rule to describe monetary policy,
rather than calculate optimum monetary policy.
17above target in a Taylor rule, whereas in our case it corresponds to a substantial fall in real interest
rates following a positive cost-push shock. When there is no …scal feedback, …scal instruments
do nothing to prevent a debt interest spiral. To avoid an explosive solution for debt, monetary
rather than …scal policy must stabilize the government’s debt stock, along the lines discussed
above. However, unlike the literature cited above, our alternative regime does not always involve
an active monetary policy, a point which we return to when we look at alternative steady state
values of debt.
4.5 Fiscal feedback and welfare
As Panel II in Figure 2 shows, there is a non-trivial di¤erence in the levels of welfare attained
in the two asymptotically stable regimes, which at its greatest is around 0.25% of steady state
consumption. While the papers cited above, and the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level more
generally, have shown that a lack of …scal feedback does not necessary lead to model instability, it
is clear from our results that weak or zero …scal feedback seriously damages the ability of monetary
policy to reduce the social costs of macroeconomic shocks. These results are in contrast with those
obtained by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) where the di¤erence does not exceed 0.05% of steady
state consumption. This contrast re‡ects our inclusion of cost-push shocks, which in models of
this kind are the most problematic for monetary policy. Taste/technology shocks are much less
important because, with optimal monetary policy, they only in‡uence our economy through their
impact on debt, as we showed in Section 2.5, and the gain from eliminating these e¤ects is small.
The optimal value of ￿ (which we denote as ￿ ￿, and which was used to plot dashed lines in
Panel II in Figure 3) is very close to the lowest possible value that sustains this regime, ￿￿. As we
noted above, at ￿ = ￿￿; one of the system’s eigenvalues is exactly unity, and this corresponds with
a unit root process for debt. At the optimal value of lambda (￿ = ￿ ￿), therefore, debt is almost a
unit root process, but will eventually return to its original steady state value. We saw in Section
3 that joint monetary-…scal optimization would imply a unit root process for debt. However,
we noted from Figure 1 that under fully optimal …scal policy the debt implications of the shock
are not completely accommodated: there is an attempt in the …rst period to reduce spending
and thereby moderate the eventual increase in debt. This initial path for government spending
cannot be replicated under our simple feedback rule, because spending is tied to debt. Although
this short term di¤erence is small in quantitative terms, it helps explain why the optimal level of
…scal feedback (￿ ￿) is very slightly above that required for a unit root process. The optimal value
of …scal feedback, although it does not produce a unit root process, is extremely close to one:
18debt is substantially above its original level even after 500 years. (This is shown as p = 0:0 case
in Figure 6, Panel II.) The value ￿ = ￿ ￿ implies that for every $100 that debt is above its steady
state level, government spending is reduced by $1.25 a quarter.
For ￿ > ￿ ￿; Panel II in Figure 2 shows that the welfare loss steadily increases, although even
when adjustment becomes large (a value of ￿ = 0:3 implies that government spending falls by $30
each quarter for every $100 that debt is above steady state), the loss is never as great as in the
case of ￿ = 0. However, the increase in loss does demonstrate the macroeconomic costs involved
in attempting to correct debt too quickly when government spending is the …scal instrument.15
While a policy that set ￿ a little above ￿ ￿ would have little cost, setting a much larger value for
￿ would incur signi…cant costs.
Increasing ￿ beyond its optimal value does have a noticeable impact on optimal monetary
policy: the response of interest rates to the cost push shock initially falls as ￿ increases, and
becomes negative for a time. One reason for this is as follows. For large ￿, …scal policy helps
stabilize the impact of a cost push shock. The shock raises debt (see above), which with large ￿
implies a substantial decline in government spending. This de‡ates the economy, implying less
of a need for real interest rates to rise. However, this form of feedback is less e¢cient at demand
stabilization than monetary policy, as the values for welfare show. Although both …scal and
monetary policy act directly on demand (through public and private consumption respectively),
…scal policy only acts when debt changes, whereas optimal monetary policy can respond directly
to in‡ationary shocks, and is therefore more e¢cient. These results also suggest that we cannot
characterize this policy regime as always involving an active monetary policy, a point that is
reinforced (and explained) when we look at higher initial debt levels. However, monetary policy
is always considerably more active than when there is minimal …scal feedback.
Finally, we compare welfare under joint monetary-…scal optimization with welfare when …scal
feedback is optimal. We argued above that, given current institutional arrangements, …scal feed-
back represents a more realistic view of …scal policy setting than a fully optimal …scal policy, but
it is interesting to note what the costs of this are. The di¤erence between welfare in the two poli-
cies can be observed by comparing Table 1, (when government spending is the only instrument)
with welfare when …scal feedback is at the optimal ￿ ￿. This amounts to only 0.002% of steady
state consumption. In this case, therefore, there is only a small cost in restricting …scal policy to
respond to debt alone.
15The costs of larger ￿ ‘come from’ the quadratic term in g in social welfare. If we arti…cially delete this term,
the loss function after ￿
￿ would be ‡at. However, as we noted above, even if all government spending was pure
waste, g would still in‡uence social welfare.
195 Generality of the Results
5.1 Tax rate as an instrument
Our choice of government spending rather than the income tax rate as the dependent variable
in the …scal feedback rule was essentially arbitrary. One argument in favour of using taxes
rather than spending is that the latter is less ‡exible, and some components of spending may
be e¤ectively exogenous. If we used income taxes instead, then the …scal feedback rule would
become
(￿t ￿ ￿n
t )Y = ! (Bt ￿ B); (33)





It can be shown (see Appendix C) that if we put ! 6= 0 but impose ￿ = 0 then the system of
…rst order conditions is structurally very similar to the one where we used gt as an instrument.
We can easily obtain similar analytical results: (i) if ! = 0 then there is an asymptotically stable








then there is an asymptotically stable regime with active monetary policy and (iii) if 0 < ! < !￿
then there is a moderately explosive regime.
Panel I in Figure 4 repeats Panel II in Figure 2 for varying ! but keeping ￿ = 0; i.e. …scal
feedback involves income taxes, and not government spending. Although the pattern is broadly
the same as in Figure 2, there are three notable di¤erences. First, at the optimal feedback
parameter, welfare is slightly better than with feedback on government spending. Second, this
optimal value is just below, rather than just above, the value of feedback associated with a unit
root debt process (!￿).16 Third, as ! increases beyond !￿, the welfare cost of the cost-push shock
increases at a much more gradual rate than when government spending was the …scal instrument.
The reason for this is that government spending impacts directly on demand, whereas taxes work
16Recall that the fully optimal path of taxes following a cost-push shock involved a large initial cut, which was
then reversed. Clearly a simple feedback rule on debt cannot replicate this, but feedback that is just below !
￿
makes a partial attempt. In contrast, when government spending was the …scal instrument, its optimum path
overshot its long run level level, so ￿ ￿ > ￿
￿ in that case.
20through consumption and labour supply. The income e¤ect will be smoothed by consumers, so
strong feedback on debt will interfere less with monetary policy.
What if we used both government spending and taxes? If we vary (￿;!) over the domain
((￿;!) 2 [0;￿] ￿ [0;￿];￿ ￿ ￿￿;￿ ￿ !￿) then we can plot the value of losses as a function of ￿
and !:Panel II in Figure 4 plots level contours in the non-explosive area. The minimum loss is
achieved with a mixed policy, but where the feedback on government spending is small. As a
result, this policy is similar to the tax only policy discussed above.
5.2 Varying the steady state level of debt
We look at two alternative steady state levels of debt, zero and doubling the base case to 60% of
GDP.17 The latter still involves levels that are well below those in many industrialized countries.
However our model is not complex enough to distinguish between debt of di¤erent maturities,
and so we may be overestimating the impact of changes in short term rates on debt interest
payments. As a result, a conservative choice of steady state debt levels seems appropriate. The
key parameters that determine the debt accumulation process are ￿;￿ and ￿: However, not all of
them are independent. If we take the share of government spending to output (1 ￿ ￿) as given,
then there is a relationship that links the steady state level of the tax rate ￿ with the steady state
level of debt to output ratio, ￿ :
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ + 1 ￿ ￿: (36)
This relationship either determines ￿ for given ￿; or determines ￿ given ￿: In what follows we
assume that ￿ and ￿ determine ￿. The higher the level of debt the higher the steady state level
of taxes. Higher taxes widen the area over which optimal monetary policy produces outcomes
that are not asymptotically stable, as formulae (31) and (35) show. (See the discussion of ￿￿ in
Section 4.3.)
If the steady state level of debt is zero (￿ = 0) then the linearization in Section 2 should be
changed as we cannot construct ^ Bt: As ￿ = 0 then for small disturbances Bt itself will be ‘small’,




(~ bt + (1 ￿ ￿)gt ￿ ￿yt); (37)
but where ~ bt = Bt: There are two di¤erences between expressions (37) and (18). First, there are
no …rst-order e¤ects of interest rates and in‡ation on debt in (37) and, second, taste/productivity
17For simplicity, we assume that government spending is the …scal instrument.
21shocks do not have …rst-order e¤ect on debt if B = 0. Fiscal rule (52) remains the same, but
the notation ~ bt is recycled. We therefore need to solve the system (15), (16), (17), (37) and
(52). Again, we can solve the system of …rst order conditions and obtain that there is a region of
explosion when 0 < ￿ < ￿￿ where ￿￿ is given by the same formula (31) but where ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿ as
follows from formula (36).
If B 6= 0 then monetary policy a¤ects debt via two channels. The …rst channel is direct: a
change in interest rates has a one-to-one e¤ect on debt. The second channel is indirect: a change
in interest rates in‡uences price setting and consumption decisions, which impact on output and
taxes. By putting B = 0 we eliminate the …rst channel but retain the ability to a¤ect debt via
the second channel.
Panel I in Figure 5 repeats Panel II in Figure 2 for the three levels of initial debt. The di¤erent
policy regimes in terms of feedback parameters and welfare costs are evident in all cases, but there
are some interesting di¤erences. First, when …scal feedback is zero, welfare losses are greatest
when the steady state debt is also zero. This follows from the fact that in this case monetary
policy is required to stabilize debt, but its ability to do so is severely weakened by the absence of a
debt interest channel. The higher is debt, the less costly the absence of …scal feedback is. Second,
in the high debt case, the feedback parameter on the cost push shock remains negative, even
when …scal feedback becomes signi…cant. This change in also re‡ected in the actual movement of
interest rates following the cost-push shock, as Panel II in Figure 5 shows. Interest rates initially
fall following a cost push shock, although they increase quite quickly thereafter. The consequences
of a large initial stock of debt are therefore to delay the point at which interest rates rise. The
reasons for this are very similar to our discussion of Figure 3 when there was no …scal feedback.
A key di¤erence is that with no …scal feedback monetary policy was forced to delay the increase
in interest rates because it had to control debt, whereas in this case it is simply preferable to use
monetary policy rather than …scal feedback to control debt.
This result suggests that the link between optimal monetary policy and …scal feedback on
debt is rather more complex than a simple ‘no feedback = passive monetary policy, signi…cant
feedback = active monetary policy’ equation. If we compute a fully optimal …scal policy when
debt is high both the direct feedback of interest rates on the cost-push shock and the initial
change in interest rates is negative. However, it remains the case that monetary policy is always
more active/less passive when …scal feedback is at or above its optimal level compared to when
…scal feedback is negligible. This remains true even if steady state levels are doubled yet again to
over 120% of annual GDP.
225.3 Sensitivity to source of shocks
As we noted in Section 4.3, welfare losses are dominated by the impact of the cost-push shock. To
what extent might our results therefore be speci…c to this shock? To examine this, we repeated
the loss chart from the …rst two columns in Panel II in Figure 2 setting the cost push shock to
zero. As the chart in the third column of the same panel shows, the basic characteristics of welfare
as …scal feedback varies are identical, although of course the size of the welfare losses are much
smaller. The size of the welfare losses shown in this case are much more comparable to those in
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007). This indicates that our basic results are robust to choice of
shocks.
5.4 Blanchard-Yaari consumers and intergenerational e¤ects
The results discussed so far assume that consumers are in…nitely lived, so changes in government
debt/personal wealth have no direct e¤ect on the pattern of consumer spending over time. In this
section we examine an alternative set up, where consumers have …nite lives, using the framework
due to Blanchard and Yaari (Blanchard (1985)). (Blanchard/Yaari consumers are also modelled
in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000), who examine issues of stability and monetary/…scal policy
interaction in a monetary union, as well as Smets and Wouters (2002) and Ganelli (2005)).
With Blanchard/Yaari consumers, we now have a direct route whereby changes in government
debt will in‡uence changes in consumption, and we want to examine the extent to which the
results described above continue to hold. Introducing Blanchard/Yaari consumers does, however,
introduce costs in terms of complexity, which is why we do not examine them in the base case.
Appendix D outlines the changes to the model when consumers have …nite lives.
Panel I in Figure 6 repeats the analysis shown in Panel II in Figure 2 when government
spending is the …scal instrument. The broad pattern is the same, but there is one signi…cant
di¤erence. The area where the economy is not asymptotically stable shifts slightly to the right.
(We choose a deliberately high value for the probability of death for this …gure so that this point
is clear.) This is consistent with results in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000), where the critical value
of ￿ derived from the determinate stability condition is a positive function of p.18 The economic
18Our results go beyond those in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000), who also consider Blanchard–Yaari consumers,
in three respects. First, we show for negligible …scal feedback that the optimal monetary policy is still passive (it
responds negatively to in‡ation) even though it can also feedback directly from debt. Second, we show that the
optimal monetary policy is strongly passive: the negative feedback on the cost push shock and in‡ation is very
large. (This result is hinted at, but not established, in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000).) Third, Panel I in Figure 6
shows that this passive monetary policy, while it stabilizes debt, has a clear welfare cost compared to the alternative
regime with signi…cant …scal feedback.
23reason for this is as follows. A cost push shock with an active monetary policy raises debt, and
this has a positive impact on demand through consumption with Blanchard Yaari consumers. As
a result, monetary policy will generate a larger increase in interest rates, which in turn requires
a larger decrease in government spending to prevent a debt interest spiral. In fact, there is a
natural neutrality result here. The net impact of debt on demand combines the positive wealth
e¤ect from Blanchard–Yaari consumers with the negative e¤ect operating through …scal feedback.
It seems logical that if the former increases (because of larger p), then optimal ￿ should rise in a
corresponding way, thereby neutralizing the overall impact of debt on demand.
We also compute the joint monetary-…scal optimal policy when we have Blanchard Yaari
consumers. Recall that with in…nitely lived consumers, this policy implied a unit root process for
debt, a result that is consistent with …ndings in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Benigno
and Woodford (2004). However, there has until now been no equivalent analysis in a model where
consumers have …nite lives and there are no bequests. We …nd that the random walk result does
not hold in this case. Joint monetary-…scal optimization produces a system where one of the
eigenvalues is very close to one, but not equal to one. The reason for this is as follows. In a model
with Blanchard Yaari consumers, the steady state real interest rate is no longer always equal to
the rate of time preference, but instead is increasing in the steady state level of debt. A standard
result from consumption smoothing is that if the real rate of interest di¤ers from the rate of time
preference we get ‘tilting’, and the same applies in this case to the path of public consumption
chosen when the policy maker optimizes. This makes a pure random walk outcome suboptimal.
However, as Panel II in Figure 6 shows, for realistic values of the probability of death the behavior
of debt, both for a fully optimal policy and for optimal …scal feedback, are very close to a unit
root process, with less than half of any debt in excess of steady state eliminated after 250 years.
In this analysis, we have continued to assume that the monetary policy maker maximizes social
welfare, which includes the welfare of unborn generations. (For a discussion of how this is done,
see Appendix D.) However, this masks the potential for intergenerational con‡ict when …scal
feedback is modest. The right hand picture in Panel III in Figure 6 plots the di¤erence between
the per period social welfare loss for two values of ￿: speci…cally Hs(￿ = 0:05) ￿ Hs(￿ = ￿￿),
where Hs is the per period loss at time s. In the …rst few periods the loss of feeding back on debt
with large feedback outweighs the loss of the value of feedback that produces a unit root process
in debt: After a number of periods, however, the (constant) loss from having unit root dynamics
outweighs the loss of having strong feedback; in the latter case the economy is brought back to
the steady state, so the loss will become zero. It is clear that from the point of view of future
24generations, a level of …scal feedback that comes close to a unit root process for debt (i.e. the
socially optimal ￿ ￿) is not preferred to one where …scal feedback is more rapid. By implication,
current generations will prefer a level of …scal feedback that is less rapid than ￿ ￿.
We can con…rm this by assuming that the monetary authority is ‘captured’ by currently living
generations, and so maximizes an objective function which discounts per period social welfare at
a rate equal to ￿=(1 + p), rather than ￿: In this case the monetary authority can allow debt to
explode at a rate less than
p
(1 + p)=￿. An interesting result is that the optimal value (from
the monetary policymaker’s point of view) of …scal feedback in this case becomes very small, at
almost zero. In e¤ect, current generations are able to disregard the debt problem completely,
because it only a¤ects future generations, and therefore prefer a value of …scal feedback that
allows them to maximize their impact on in‡ation. At this new optimal level of …scal feedback
debt explodes at a rate that is greater than 1=
p
￿, but which is still less than
p
(1 + p)=￿: We
plot the policymaker’s loss as a dashed line in the second picture in the Panel, indicating by a
dotted line the area of explosion. Social welfare, plotted as a solid line, is only …nite when the
rate of explosion is smaller than 1=
p
￿; so the social loss becomes in…nite in a neighborhood of
the captured policymaker’s best choice of …scal feedback.
6 Conclusion
We have examined the impact of di¤erent degrees of …scal feedback on debt in an economy with
nominal inertia where monetary policy is optimal. Consumers are either in…nitely lived, or of
the Blanchard Yaari type. Our focus is on the extent to which di¤erent speeds of …scal feedback
on debt enhance or detract from the ability of the monetary authorities to stabilize output and
in‡ation.
We use a welfare function derived from utility, and calculate joint …scal-monetary optimization
(i.e. a fully optimal …scal policy with no constraints) as a benchmark. If consumers are in…nitely
lived we …nd that debt follows a unit root process, as found in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)
and Benigno and Woodford (2004). However, if consumers are of the Blanchard Yaari type, joint
…scal-monetary optimization no longer involves an exact unit root process, although it is close
to it. If we then restrict …scal policy to follow a simple feedback on debt, a formulation which
seems closer to current institutional practice, we …nd the optimal level of …scal feedback to be
small. With this optimal degree of …scal feedback, the behavior of debt is very close to a unit
root process following shocks.
At low or moderate levels of initial debt we directly infer that optimal monetary policy is
25active, in the sense that real interest rates initially rise following an increase in in‡ation, both for
fully optimal …scal policy and for the optimal level of …scal feedback. In addition, we …nd that
the costs of restricting …scal policy to only respond to debt are small compared to a fully optimal
…scal policy, if government spending is the …scal instrument. We also show that …scal feedback
using taxes rather than government spending is slightly preferable in welfare terms. If the initial
debt stock is large so that changes in interest rates have a large impact on the government’s
budget constraint, then monetary policy may no longer be active under optimal …scal feedback
or joint …scal-monetary optimization.
There is a discontinuity in the behavior of monetary policy and welfare either side of this
optimal level of …scal feedback. As the extent of …scal feedback increases beyond the optimal
level, optimal monetary policy becomes less active because …scal feedback also tends to de‡ate
in‡ationary shocks. However this …scal stabilization is less e¢cient than monetary policy, and so
welfare declines. In contrast, if …scal feedback falls below the optimal level, then optimal monetary
policy initially permits solutions that are mildly explosive, so that they are not asymptotically
stable. In addition monetary policy becomes much more passive in nature, in the sense that
interest rates initially fall sharply despite higher in‡ation. When …scal feedback becomes zero
optimal monetary policy remains passive, but the economy is asymptotically stable. This policy
regime has strong similarities to the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. We show that while this
passive monetary policy may succeed in controlling debt, it leads to a sharp deterioration in
welfare.
A Steady State and Welfare
A.1 Government expenditures in steady state
The aggregate demand relationship (13) always holds along the dynamic path of the economy,































(  + ￿￿)
We assume that the steady state level of government expenditures is chosen to maximise the
utility function (1) (subject to aggregate demand constraint and aggregate supply conditions),
so that in the steady state19:
@
@G
(u(Cs) + f(G) ￿ v(Ys)) = uC(C)
@C
@G
















 (1 ￿ ￿)￿w=￿ + ￿￿
(  + ￿￿)
(41)

























A.2 Derivation of the Social Welfare Function
The derivation of the welfare metric is standard and for this model it is explained in detail in
Kirsanova et al. (2006). The one-period (‡ow) welfare in (20) is Wt :
















































where we assumed ￿ = ￿uC=uCCC = ￿fG=fGGG;   = ￿vy=vyyY:
















19Derivatives of constraints are equal to zero so we did not include them in the …nal expression.
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fG
uC



































To transform this equation into a more convenient form that does not include linear terms,
we proceed as follows (see Beetsma and Jensen (2004b)). We have derived relationship (41) for
fG=uC in the steady state. If the government removes monopolistic distortions and distortions







































(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿2
t
so, using the conventional notation for gap variables, we get the …nal formula for the social welfare
function:
Ws = ￿
￿(￿ +  )￿￿






















which is formula (21) in the main text.
B Optimal Commitment Plan









20…nanced by lump-sum taxation, ￿
w = T:





sQ11Ys + 2Y 0
sQ12Xs + X0





s+1(A11Ys + A12Xs + B1Us ￿ Ys+1) + ￿
p0
s+1(A21Ys + A22Xs + B2Us ￿ Xs+1)
where ￿n is a vector of non-predetermined Lagrange multipliers (those associated with the prede-
termined variables Y ) and ￿p is a vector of predetermined Lagrange multipliers (those associated
with the non-predetermined variables X). To derive the …rst order conditions we di¤erentiate the
constrained loss function with respect to X, Y , U, and ￿ to obtain the following system (we also
used Ls = ￿￿s￿s to simplify notation):
@H
@Xs






s = 0 (45)
@H
@Ys

























: A21Ys + A22Xs + B2Us ￿ Xs+1 = 0 (49)
This system must be solved using initial conditions for all predetermined variables (Y0 and L
p
0)
and terminal conditions (transversality conditions) for all non-predetermined variables (X, Ln
and U). We observe Y0, and the Pontryagin maximum principle requires that the initial conditions
for the predetermined Lagrange multipliers should be set to zero,21 L
p
0 = 0. For a unique solution,
the system (45)–(49) should have as many explosive eigenvalues (i.e. absolute values outside the
unit circle) as the number of non-predetermined variables.

































where matrices Z, S and T are obtained by solving a particular generalised eigenvalue problem,
see e.g. Söderlind (1999).
The requirement to set initial conditions Lx
0 = 0 highlights the problem of time-inconsistency
associated with the fully optimal solution. As soon as optimisation is done at time t and ￿x
t
21For a very clear explanation see Currie and Levine (1993).
29is set to zero, this implies a certain time path for fL
p
sg1
s=t such that L
p
s is not necessarily zero
for any s > t. It immediately follows that given an option to re-optimise at any time s > t,
the policymaker will choose to re-set L
p
s to zero, reneging on the previously optimal plan. The




11 ; N = ￿Z21Z￿1
11
so we can partition N conformally with U;X and Ln
s and write Ln
s = ￿NyYs ￿ N￿L
p
s: It was
shown in Currie and Levine (1993) that the minimum welfare loss for the stochastic problem








where V11 = cov(￿;￿):
Note that from formula (50) it follows that Ut = ￿yYt + #LL
p
t so we can write the optimal





multipliers, associated with constraints on in‡ation and consumption. Lagrange multiplies them-
selves can be presented as discounted linear combination of past values of ￿ and c: Thus, all right
hand side variables in (32) are predetermined (see Currie and Levine (1993)). This representa-
tion of the optimal policy is useful in judging whether policy is active or passive: we can look
at the sign (and size) of ￿–coe¢cients, as they will determine the reaction of the interest rate
to shocks in the short run. #–coe¢cients are set on predetermined Lagrange multipliers, which
move relatively slowly in the short run, as they are integrals of past variables.
C General Solution to Optimisation problem when Government
uses Spending and Taxes









30then substitution of these rulse into system (15)-(19) yields:
cs = Etcs+1 ￿ ￿(is ￿ ￿s+1)
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(1 ￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)￿ + !))~ bs ￿ ￿￿s ￿ ￿￿cs
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+ ^ ￿t
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(1 ￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)￿ + !))~ bs ￿ ￿￿s ￿ ￿￿cs
￿
+ ^ ￿t ￿~ bs+1
￿
In order to minimise the loss function, we di¤erentiate the Lagrangian with respect to Lc;
L￿; Lb; ￿; c; b and i. The …rst order conditions for optimality are:
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(1 ￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)￿ + !))~ bs ￿ ￿￿s ￿ ￿￿cs
￿
+ ^ ￿s ￿~ bs+1 (61)
31The system can be written in a general matrix form Szt+1 = Qzt as follows. (We have
substituted out it = 1
￿ct+1 + ￿t+1 ￿ 1
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All …nite generalised eigenvalues can be found as a solutions of a matrix equation
det(Q ￿ ￿S) = 0
We now …nd which values of parameters ￿ and ! deliver the ‘boundary stability case’, i.e.
￿ = 1 or ￿ = 1
￿
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Its determinant (up to constant multiplier) is
det(Q￿S) = ((! ((1 ￿ ￿)  + ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿ (1 +  )) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(((1 ￿ ￿)  + ￿￿) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))))
￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(  + ￿￿) ￿ ! ((1 ￿ ￿)  + ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿ (1 +  ))) ￿ ￿
￿
  (1 ￿ ￿)
2 + ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿
either
(i). ! ((1 ￿ ￿)  + ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿ (1 +  )) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(((1 ￿ ￿)  + ￿￿) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)) = 0
or
(ii). (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(  + ￿￿)￿! ((1 ￿ ￿)  + ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿ (1 +  )))￿￿
￿
  (1 ￿ ￿)





















￿ 0 0 0
(1￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ 0
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Its determinant (up to constant multiplier) is
det(Q￿S) = (! ((1 ￿ ￿)  + ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿ (1 +  )) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(((1 ￿ ￿)  + ￿￿) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)))
￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(  + ￿￿) ￿ ! ((1 ￿ ￿)  + ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿ (1 +  ))) ￿ ￿
￿
  (1 ￿ ￿)
2 + ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿
and we end up with the same pair of equations:
(i). ! ((1 ￿ ￿)  + ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿ (1 +  )) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(((1 ￿ ￿)  + ￿￿) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)) = 0
or
(ii). (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(  + ￿￿)￿! ((1 ￿ ￿)  + ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿ (1 +  )))￿￿
￿
  (1 ￿ ￿)
2 + ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
= 0
Note that none of the expressions for stability boundaries depends on parameters of utility
function; they only depend on the structural parameters of the economy.
These results suggest that (we used ￿ + ￿ ￿ 1 = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ to substitute out ￿)
(i) If
￿ = ￿!
((￿ +  ) ￿ ￿￿ (1 +  ))￿
((1 ￿ ￿)(  + 1) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
then there is at least one generalised eigenvalue that is equal to one, and at least one generalised
eigenvalue that is equal to 1
￿: This straight line passes through (￿;!) =(0;0) point and for a wide




















then there is at least one generalised eigenvalue that is equal to one, and at least one generalised
eigenvalue that is equal to 1


















point and for a wide range of reasonable parameters is negatively sloped.
33The two lines intersect at
!0 = 1 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿(  + ￿)
￿(  + 1)
< 0;
￿0 =
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿





We plot the both lines in Figure 7. At point A there is no di¤erence between passive and
active policies. In other words, if we start at point like B (where the monetary policy reacts to
cost push shock by raising interest rate, given that both tax and spending feed back on debt) and
move along the line towards point A then the following happens. The reaction of the tax o¤sets
the reaction of spending more and more. At points close to A monetary policy will have to react
to debt (accommodate cost-push shocks) more and more.
We can start at point like C, where …scal policy actually prevents debt stabilisation and so
monetary policy stabilises debt. If we move towards A then the stabilising reaction of government
spending on debt outweighs the destabilising reaction of taxes and monetary policy becomes more
active. At point A monetary and …scal policies neither passive nor active.
Note that we can move between B and C avoiding mild explosion. Although ‘crossing this
bridge’ is costly, perhaps, it is of value to know that by changing …scal parameters smoothly we
can get out of the area of passive monetary policy without even mild instability.
D The Model with Blanchard Yaari consumers
This section gives an overview of changes to the model and the welfare metric. Further appendices
E, F and G provide details of derivations. We need to make a number of changes to our model,
described by equations (15)– (19). First, as consumers have a constant probability of death, p, the
discount factor in formula (1) becomes ￿=(1+p): Second, in the household budget constraint (2),
the discount factor takes account of mortality, Et(Qt;t+1) = 1
(1+it)(1+p): Third, these modi…cations
and the fact that we now have an in…nite number of living cohorts at each moment of time, results
in a new system for aggregate variables. The …rst order conditions for individual consumption,
and then aggregation of all such behavioural equations, leads to a pair of equations for aggregate
consumption and for the average propensity to consume, instead of the single Euler equation (7):
^ Ct = [￿(1 + i)]￿￿(Et ^ Ct+1 +
p￿
￿￿
(Et ^ At+1 ￿ Et^ ￿t+1 ￿ Et^ ￿t+1)) ￿ ￿(^ {t ￿ Et^ ￿t+1); (62)
(1 + p)(1 + i)
￿￿(1 + i)￿
^ ￿t = Et^ ￿t+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(^ {t ￿ Et^ ￿t+1); (63)
34where 1=￿t is average propensity to consume out of total resources, resources which consist of
nominal …nancial wealth and human wealth. Equations (62) and (63) can be written in terms of
gap variables. The resulting four equations should now be included in a system like that shown
in equations (15)– (19), instead of equation (15).
To evaluate gains and losses we need a welfare metric. In the Blanchard-Yaari case, unlike
in the in…nitely-lived case, there is no obvious choice. Ideally total welfare should be evaluated
using a social welfare function that aggregates across generations and weights the utility of every
generation. It is not clear, however, how to treat future unborn generations. Calvo and Obstfeld
(1988) discuss the importance of including unborn generation in the social welfare metric. If they
are excluded, we introduce an additional source of time-inconsistency, as the policy which treats
some particular generation di¤erently will be necessarily time-inconsistent. However, straightfor-
ward aggregating of the utilities of unborn generations is not feasible for computational reasons.
One way to overcome this di¢culty is to suggest that the government uses a weighting scheme
that makes the aggregate welfare of overlapping generations equivalent to the welfare of one in-
…nitely long lived generation of consumers. A similar strategy was also adopted by Calvo and
Obstfeld (1988). We therefore use formulae (21) to obtain our results.
E Derivation of Consumption Equation for Blanchard-Yaari con-
sumers
E.1 Individual Relationships





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































F Fiscal policy and the Steady State
We assume that the government …nances its de…cit by bonds, and nominal bonds accumulate as:
Bt+1 = (1 + it)(Bt + GtPt ￿ ￿YtPt) (72)
38There is no physical capital in this model, so At = Bt. In a steady state with zero in‡ation and
prices normalized to one, the following relationships will hold:
A = (1 + i)(A + (1 ￿ ￿)Y ￿ C) (73)
B = (1 + i)(B + G ￿ ￿Y ) (74)
￿C = A + H (75)
H =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + i)(1 + p)
(1 + i)(1 + p) ￿ 1
Y (76)
C = ￿Y (77)
In order to obtain relationship (76) we computed steady state human capital as the net present
value of steady state income, accounting for the mortality rate. Equations (73) and (74) are
consistent with Y = C+G: We assume that steady state private consumption constitutes a share
￿ of steady state income, so that steady state government consumption is G = (1 ￿ ￿)Y:






(1 + p)(1 + i)
￿￿1







(1 + p)(1 + i)
￿
(1 + i)(1 + p)(1 ￿ ￿)







(1 + p)(1 + i)
￿
A (78)
A = B = ￿
(1 + i)
i
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)Y (79)
Thus, in a steady state A ( = B) can be found from equation (79), if we know ￿ and ￿:
Alternatively, if there is some steady state level for government debt in equilibrium, A = B = BY;
equation (79) can be used to …nd the steady state level of the tax rate, which ensures this steady
state level of debt, given the interest rate. Equation (78) is an equation for i; the steady state
level of the interest rate. It has a unique solution22 and in equilibrium 1 + i > 1=￿:
G Derivation of Phillips Curve









22We checked it numerically for the wide range of parameters.















t(z), where ￿w is
a labour subsidy. We do not assume any other taxes and labour is the only cost to the …rm.
All producers of good z understand that sales depend on demand, which is a function of price.









so with price ‡exibility a producer that wishes to maximise pro…t (in square brackets below) will



































































































































where we denote ￿s = ￿ ￿s
(1￿￿s): The last equation is the equation for the optimal pt(z) = p
#
t (z)



































Ps = 1 + ^ Ps
pt(z) = 1 + ^ pt(z)







































































where the term with ^ ￿s is zero as it is multiplied by ln
pf(z)
P = 0: Substitute everything in the
term in square brackets in (81):












= (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ^ pt(z)) ￿
￿
￿w(1 + ^ ￿s)
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^ ￿s + ^ ￿s
￿
= (1 ￿ ￿)
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^ ￿s ￿ ^ ￿s
￿




￿w = (1 ￿ ￿).
41Knowing that ^ Ps =
Ps￿t
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^ ￿s + ^ ￿s
!
It is easy to check that
P1
s=t(￿￿)s￿t Ps￿t
k=1 ￿t+k = 1
1￿￿￿
P1
































^ ￿s + ^ ￿s
￿
(82)
This formula is not the …nal Phillips curve, but Steinsson (2003) shows how it can be used to
derive the …nal speci…cation of the Phillips Curve, where we have rule-of-thumb price-setters, (8).
Our derivation is identical to his, so will not be repeated here. Formula (82) demonstrates how
mark-up shocks enter the Phillips curve. It also demonstrates that the constant wage income tax
￿ has no e¤ect on the dynamic equations for log-deviations from the ‡exible price equilibrium
(although it alters the equilibrium choice between consumption and leisure for the consumer).23
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Figure 1: Responses to a unit cost-push shock under fully optimal monetary and …scal policy




























Panel I: STR U C TU R E OF  EIGENVALU ES






































Panel II: SOLU TION























productiv ity  and
taste shocks only
Figure 2: The structure of eigenvalues, coe¢cients of monetary policy reaction function and social
welfare as a function of …scal feedback. Fiscal policy uses government spending as an instrument.

















Panel I: ZERO FISCAL FEEDBACK
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Panel II: ACTIVE AND PASSIVE MONETARY POLICY
























































Figure 3: Impulse responses to a unit cost-push shock, plotted for alternative feedback parameters.
Fiscal policy uses government spending as an instrument.














Panel I: SOLUTION WHEN TAXES ONLY ARE USED








































Panel II: LOSS AS FUNCTION OF λ  AND ω








Figure 4: Coe¢cients of monetary policy reaction function and social welfare as a function of
…scal feedback. Fical policy uses taxes as an instrument in Panel I and uses taxes and spending




















































































































Panel II: IMPULSE RESPONSES FOR λ = 0.05 AND DIFFERENT VALUES OF B




Figure 5: Coe¢cients of monetary policy reaction function and social welfare as a function of
…scal feedback plotted for alternative values of steady state debt (Panel I), and Impulse responses
to a unit cost push shock (Panel II). Fiscal policy uses spending as an instrument.
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Panel II: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A UNIT COST-PUSH SHOCK: DIFFERENT MORTALITY RATE, p
Panel III: INTERGENERATIONAL EFFECTS







Panel I: WEAK FISCAL FEEDBACK, p=0.06




















































difference between one-period loss
with strong fiscal feeback











Figure 6: Panel I and Panel II illustrate the e¤ect of Blanchard-Yaari consumers on the monetary
reaction function and social welfare, and impulse responses to a unit cost-push shock respectively.










Figure 7: Dynamic properties of the economy under control
51